

1975
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HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
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16 June, 1945.

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From: The Commanding General.

To: Distribution List.

Subject: Naval Gunfire Support, IWO JIMA

Enclosure: (A) Naval Gunfire Officer, Expeditionary Troop, 11th Fleet,
report, IWO JIMA.

Maj., Inf.

Custodian

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R. McC. PATE,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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Com3rdPhibFor	(1)	CO, 3rd ASCO	(30)
Com5thPhibFor	(1)	CO, 4th ASCO	(30)
Com7thPhibFor	(1)	CO, 5th ASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 1	(1)	CO, 6th ASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 3	(1)	CO, 71st JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 4	(1)	CO, 75th JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 5	(1)	CO, 292d JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 6	(1)	CO, 294th JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 7	(1)	CO, 295th JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 8	(1)	CO, 591st JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 9	(1)	CO, 592d JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 10	(1)	CO, 593rd JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 11	(1)	CO, 594th JASCO	(30)
ComPhibGroup 12	(1)	ComPhibTraPac	(5)
ComPhibGroup 13	(1)	OIC, PacFltCy&TorpSchl	(5)
ComPhibGroup 14	(1)	OIC, PacFltCIGSchl	(2)
ComPhibGroup 15	(1)	OIC, PacFltRadarCenter	(1)
ComPhibGroup 16	(1)	OIC, NGLOSchl, PhibTraPac,	
MCS	(1)	ATB, Coronado	(25)

Subject: Naval Gunfire Support, IWO JIMA.

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CG, TroTroUnit	(10)	HOWORTH, D	(1)
CO, FwdEchTFFac	(2)	ComDesRon	(1)
CO, SoSu 1	(10)	TERRY, DD 515	(1)
CO, VOC 1	(5)	CAFFS, DD 550	(1)
CO, VOC 2	(5)	EVANS, DD 552	(1)
CO, VC 33	(5)	JOHN D. HENLEY, DD 553	(1)
ComBatRon 1	(1)	ComDesDiv 92	(1)
ComBatDiv 2	(1)	BOYD, DD 544	(1)
TENNESSEE, BB 43	(1)	BRADFORD, DD 545	(1)
NEVADA, BB 36	(1)	ComDesRon 47	(1)
ComBatDiv 3	(1)	ROCKS, DD 504	(1)
IDAHO, BB 42	(1)	ComDesDiv 94	(1)
ComBatDiv 4	(1)	GREGORY, DD 502	(1)
WEST VIRGINIA, BB 48	(1)	ComDesRon 48	(1)
ComBatDiv 5	(1)	STEBEL, DD 644	(1)
TEXAS, BB 35	(1)	ComDesRon 50	(1)
ARKANSAS, BB 33	(1)	CLARENCE K. BRONSON, DD 668	(1)
NEW YORK, BB 34	(1)	COTTEN, DD 669	(1)
ComBatRon 2	(1)	DORTCH, DD 670	(1)
ComBatDiv 6	(1)	GATLING, DD 671	(1)
WASHINGTON, BB 56	(1)	HEALY, DD 672	(1)
NORTH CAROLINA, BB 55	(1)	ComDesRon 51	(1)
ComCruDiv 4	(1)	HALL, DD 583	(1)
INDIANAPOLIS, CA 35	(1)	PAUL HAMILTON, DD 590	(1)
ComCruDiv 5	(1)	ComDesRon 56	(1)
CHESTER, CA 27	(1)	LEUTZE, DD 481	(1)
PENSACOLA, CA 24	(1)	NEWCOMB, DD 586	(1)
SALT LAKE CITY, CA 25	(1)	BENNION, DD 662	(1)
ComCruDiv 6	(1)	HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, DD 663	(1)
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 38	(1)	RICHARD P. LEARY, DD 664	(1)
TUSCALOOSA, CA 37	(1)	ComDesDiv 112	(1)
ComCruDiv 10	(1)	IZARD, DD 589	(1)
BOSTON, CA 69	(1)	BRYANT, DD 665	(1)
ComCruDiv 13	(1)	ComDesRon 60	(1)
SANTA FE, CL 60	(1)	ComDesDiv 120	(1)
BIRMINGHAM, CL 62	(1)	INGRAHAM, DD 694	(1)
BILOXI, CL 50	(1)	ComDesRon 62	(1)
ComCruDiv 14	(1)	WALDRON, DD 699	(1)
VICKSBURG, CL 56	(1)	ComDesRon 63	(1)
ComCruDiv 17	(1)	ComDesDiv 126	(1)
PASADENA, CL 65	(1)	HYMAN, DD 732	(1)
ASTORIA, CL 90	(1)	ComDesRon 66	(1)
WILKES BARRE, CL 103	(1)	FUTNAM, DD 757	(1)
ComDesRon 1	(1)	McCALL, DD 400	(1)
DEWEY, DD 349	(1)	ComMinRon 3	(1)
ComDesDiv 2	(1)	ComMinDiv 7	(1)
AYLWIF, DD 355	(1)	SHANTON, DM 25	(1)
ComDesRon 6	(1)	ROBERT H. SMITH, DM 23	(1)
ComDesDiv 12	(1)	THOMAS B. FRASER, DM 24	(1)
RALPH TALBOT, DD 390	(1)	HARRY F. BAUER, DM 26	(1)
ComDesRon 24	(1)	ComMinDiv 8	(1)
BACHE, DD 470	(1)	HENRY A. WILEY, DM 29	(1)
ANTHONY, DD 515	(1)	Com LCS Flotilla 3	(1)
WADSWORTH, DD 516	(1)	Com LCS Group 7	(1)
ComDesDiv 45	(1)	LCS 31	(1)
MULLANY, DD 528	(1)	LCS 32	(1)
VAN VALKENBURGH, DD 656	(1)	LCS 33	(1)
ComDesRon 45	(1)	LCS 34	(1)
GUEST, DD 472	(1)	LCS 35	(1)
FULLAN, DD 474	(1)	LCS 36	(1)
BENNETT, DD 473	(1)	LCS 51	(1)
HUDSON, DD 475	(1)	LCS 52	(1)
ComDesDiv 90	(1)	LCS 53	(1)
STANLY, DD 478	(1)	LCS 54	(1)

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LCS 55	(1)	Com LCI Flotilla 23	(1)
LCS 56	(1)	Com LCI Group 67	(1)
Com LCI Flotilla 3	(1)	LCI 351	(1)
Com LCI Group 8	(1)	LCI 352	(1)
LCI 346	(1)	LCI 354	(1)
LCI 348	(1)	LCI 355	(1)
LCI 438	(1)	LCI 356	(1)
LCI 441	(1)		
LCI 449	(1)		
LCI 450	(1)		
LCI 457	(1)		
LCI 466	(1)		
LCI 473	(1)		
LCI 627	(1)		
Com LCI Flotilla 6	(1)		
Com LCI Group 17	(1)		
LCI 658	(1)		
LCI 659	(1)		
LCI 660	(1)		
LCI 754	(1)		
LCI 1056	(1)		
LCI 1057	(1)		
LCI 1058	(1)		
LCI 1059	(1)		
LCI Flotilla 16	(1)		
Com LCI Group 46	(1)		
LCI 988	(1)		
Com LCI Flotilla 13	(1)		
Com LCI Group 37	(1)		
LCI 80	(1)		
LCI 345	(1)		
LCI 425	(1)		
LCI 437	(1)		
LCI 638	(1)		
LCI 685	(1)		
Com LCI Flotilla 14	(1)		
Com LCI Group 40	(1)		
LCI 739	(1)		
LCI 740	(1)		
LCI 741	(1)		
LCI 742	(1)		
Com LCI Flotilla 21	(1)		
Com LCI Group 61	(1)		
LCI 630	(1)		
LCI 631	(1)		
LCI 632	(1)		
LCI 633	(1)		
LCI 756	(1)		
LCI 757	(1)		
LCI 760	(1)		
LCI 1010	(1)		
LCI 1011	(1)		
LCI 1012	(1)		
LCI 1023	(1)		
Com LCI Group 63	(1)		
LCI 642	(1)		
LCI 651	(1)		
LCI 707	(1)		
LCI 708	(1)		
LCI 771	(1)		
LCI 772	(1)		
LCI 1077	(1)		
LCI 1029	(1)		
LCI 1030	(1)		

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HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC,
% FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

9 June, 1945

From: The Naval Gunfire Officer, Expeditionary Troops,
FIFTH Fleet.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Naval Gunfire Support in Operations against IWO JIMA,
report on.

The following complete outline of this document is included to serve
as a guide to its use.

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I. PLANNING

A. GENERAL

1. In planing Naval Gunfire support for the attack on the objective, emphasis was laid on combining and applying the techniques developed in earlier bombardment of small atolls with those developed during the bombardment of the MARIANAS, where terrain features dictated many special measures in control of fire. Particular attention was given to improving air spot facilities and to arranging that an experienced gunnery staff be present during preliminary bombardments aboard an AGC to interpret and apply current target intelligence to the targets upon which fire was to be delivered. Advantage was not taken, however, of one lesson learned in the MARIANAS; namely, that by allowing for a bombardment of considerable length prior to DOG Day, considerable reduction can be effected in casualties among landing troops.

2. The result of emphasis on air spot and target intelligence was a marked increase in the efficiency of the bombardment. Although the total length of the bombardment was not as great as requested by the Landing Force, the greater efficiency of each day's firing was such as to minimize the loss entailed in the reduction of time.

B. SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES

1. 1st and 3rd JASCOs remained attached to the 4th and 3rd Marine Divisions respectively; 5th JASCO was attached to 5th Marine Division.

2. Shore Fire Control Sections of these three JASCOs were expanded before the operation to include Regimental Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers, Assistant Division Naval Gunfire Officers, and their respective teams, in accordance with recently authorized increases in the Table of Organization. Experienced officers were supplied from Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to fill these requirements.

3. As a result of experiences in the MARIANAS, two Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers and two Naval Gunfire Spotters were attached to each of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions to act as on-the-spot replacements. No replacements were supplied to the 3rd Marine Division, but one Liaison Officer reported to that organization immediately prior to the operation on orders of the Bureau of Personnel and participated as an available replacement.

C. AIR SPOTTERS

1. Four Air Observers from 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions were assigned to fire support ships to spot Naval Gunfire. Final assignments attached one such observer to each of ARKANSAS, TEXAS, NEW YORK, NEVADA, IDAHO, TENNESSEE, SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, CHESTER, TUSCALOOSA, SANTA FE, and BILOXI.

2. VOC 1, a fighter-spotter squadron, was also made available aboard WAKE ISLAND to supply air spot for designated fire support ships.

D. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

1. The initial plan for preliminary bombardment as set forth in the Concept provided for one Cruiser Division to bombard the objective beginning on DOG MINUS EIGHT Day, to be joined on DOG MINUS THREE Day by seven OBBS and six CAs or CLs. Based on a preliminary study of the number of targets at the objective, V Amphibious Corps recommended, on 24 October, that ten days of bombardment by a Cruiser Division plus three OBBS be arranged. The Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, stated, in reply to this recommendation, that "limitations on the availability of ships, difficulties of ammunition replacement, and loss of surprise interpose serious obstacles to meeting your recommendation." He further stated that the objective would be bombarded by one Cruiser Division on 15 December, and at irregular intervals thereafter, and that three days of bombardment by the designated ships would provide for delivery of more major calibre fire than had been requested by V Amphibious Corps.

2. On 8 November, after a more careful study of the target area had been made, V Amphibious Corps submitted a recommendation for a total of nine days of preliminary bombardment. On 26 November, the Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, replied to this recommendation with a study in-

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dicating the necessity of slightly more than three days of bombardment, and a statement that the troops would be provided with the best possible preliminary bombardment consistent with limitations of ammunition supply and subsequent troop requirements.

3. On 24 November, V Amphibious Corps requested that an additional day of preliminary bombardment be provided. This letter was given favorable endorsement by the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, FIFTH Fleet. The Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, forwarded this request, requesting approval provided that there was no objection on the part of the Commander, FIFTH Fleet, based on the general strategic situation; and, further, provided that the fast carrier strike could be delivered on DOG MINUS THREE Day. This recommendation was disapproved by the Commander, FIFTH Fleet, for reasons indicated below.

a. That initial surface bombardment must be simultaneous with the initial carrier attack on the TOKYO Area, and that, if continuation of the carrier strikes beyond two days were neither desirable nor necessary, the enemy could then recover early enough to initiate threatening air attacks at the objectives by DOG Day.

b. That shore based air attack to be provided could be considered at least as effective as the recommended additional day of surface ship bombardment.

c. That there would be no opportunity for replacement of naval ammunition, and that there was therefore a limit to the amount of ammunition that could be made available for preliminary bombardment, allowing sufficient ammunition for DOG Day.

4. On 2 January, after a careful study of the preliminary bombardment plan which had been prepared, V Amphibious Corps stated that it believed the preliminary gunfire to be inadequate for destruction of targets immediately inland from, and flanking, the landing beaches; and recommended that either an increase in time be allotted for preliminary bombardment, or a greater concentration of effort be placed on, and adjacent to, the main landing beaches, with a corresponding reduction in the amount of fire placed on the other areas of the island. This recommendation was approved by the Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops, FIFTH Fleet. It was in turn forwarded by the Commander, Amphibious Forces, U. S. PACIFIC Fleet, recommending disapproval for the reasons previously set forth by the Commander, FIFTH Fleet. Further comment indicated that the concentration of fire in the vicinity of the main landing beach was not considered sound, since other areas would then receive too light a coverage of fire; and that, in any case, the Commander, Amphibious Group ONE, would have the necessary authority to make changes in the plan as necessary.

5. Further changes made necessary the substitution of NEW YORK, TEXAS, ARKANSAS, TENNESSEE, IDAHO, and NEVADA, plus WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA on DOG MINUS ONE Day only, for ships originally allotted but later unavailable.

6. A special bombardment by INDIANA plus Cruiser Division FIVE was executed prior to DOG Day, with unknown results. The allotment of WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA for bombardment on DOG MINUS ONE Day was cancelled.

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II. TRAINING

A. GENERAL

In training personnel, both ashore and afloat, for the assault on IWO Jima, special emphasis was given to lessons learned during operations against the MARIANAS Group. Corrective communication training was given, based on detailed analysis of radio logs from those operations while improved control of starshell firing, closer command integration between the various echelons, and improved methods of distributing the locations of front line positions to all hands, were emphasized; as well as more extensive use of air spot. Radar Beacon Operators were added to Division and Regimental Naval Gunfire Teams ashore, and both ship and shore personnel were trained in their use. New changes in the firing mechanisms aboard rocket and mortar ships were described to all Shore Fire Control Personnel.

B. SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES

1. Shore Fire Control Sections of the 1st and 3rd JASCOs both received intensive retraining at PEARL HARBOR in preparation for this operation. Exercises were conducted in new techniques, and classroom instruction was given to bring all hands up to date on the latest developments, including the results of reports and critiques on recent operations in this area. Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers were given additional gunnery training at the Pacific Fleet Gunnery School, as practicable. Shore Bombardment Exercises were conducted at KAHOOLAWE Island with available ships of the PACIFIC Fleet. All training activities were closely supervised by the Division Naval Gunfire Officers concerned.

2. The Shore Fire Control Section of the 5th JASCO, all new except for Assistant Division and Regimental Naval Gunfire Officers, received advanced training similar to that described in Paragraph 1 above, rather than retraining. Every effort was made to give this new organization as full advantage as possible of recent operations and to emphasize group activities considered especially valuable to a new organization.

3. The Shore Fire Control Section of each JASCO executed a final rehearsal at KAHOOLAWE Island for a twenty-four hour period in which a tactical situation ashore was assumed. This included overhead fire, starshell illumination, harassing fires, call fires, and the KING Hour preparations. The exercise proved an excellent finale to the training not only of the Shore Fire Control Parties but also of the firing ships participating, who gained a realistic picture of what twenty-four hours of continuous fire support duty involves.

C. AIR SPOTTERS

1. Air Observers from the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Division received intensive training at PEARL HARBOR, including bombardment exercises at KAHOOLAWE Island, in preparation for their assignments to fire support ships. Training of V Amphibious Corps Observers was planned, but the schedule could not be completed in the time available so that they were not assigned for the operation.

2. The fighter-observer squadron to be employed, VOC 1, was given intensive training, including Bombardment Exercises at KAHOOLAWE Island. Lectures were also given aboard USS WAKE ISLAND, and all current information was supplied to the unit.

3. Replacement pilots for heavy ships of the fleet received training in communication procedure and shore bombardment while attached to SoSu 1 Replacement Pool. Others, attached to ships engaged in Communication and Shore Bombardment Exercises, received training through their participating in these exercises.

4. Underwater Demolition Teams were included, on request, in Shore

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Bombardment Exercises at KAHOOCLAWE Island. Representatives of the Naval Gunfire Section, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, participated in the exercises. After this initial indoctrination, the teams were able to conduct their own practices without further supervision.

D. FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS

1. The training program operated in the past by the Commander, Cruisers and Destroyers, PACIFIC Fleet, in conjunction with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific was continued and expanded in the period leading up to the attack on IWO Jima. All but a very few of the ships employed at IWO Jima had qualified in the Shore Bombardment Course at KAHOOCLAWE Island.

2. Communication Drills of several types, including Radar Beacon Drills, were conducted with ships made available by the Commander, Cruisers and Destroyers, PACIFIC Fleet. All ships qualified in communication procedure before executing actual bombardment practices.

E. REHEARSALS

1. Final rehearsals for the Landing Force were held in the HAWAIIAN Area from 13 January, 1945, to 18 January, 1945, inclusive. Simulated bombardments by all available fire support units were conducted during the first three days. Actual bombardments were conducted on the following days, while Shore Fire Control Parties landed on KAHOOCLAWE Island on the 17th to conduct call fires, reembarking on the 18th.

2. Since only a limited number of fire support ships had been present at the Landing Force rehearsal, the bulk of the group having been at ULITHI Atoll, further rehearsal exercises were held off the West Coast of TINIAN on 12 and 13 February, 1945, primarily for their benefit. Simulated fires were executed by fire support ships and communication nets were operated. Actual transmissions, however, were kept to a minimum in order to maintain the greatest possible degree of security.

3. In order to give all fire support ships complete details of all Plans and preferred techniques, especially those ships recently added to the fire support group as replacements, the Naval Gunfire Officer, Landing Force, gave ships' personnel special briefing at PEARL HARBOR, ULITHI, and SAIPAN.

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D-3 PRE D-DAY BOMBARDMENT Two JIMA

NOTES

- THIS MAP PREPARED FROM SHIPS ACTION REPORTS, AIR PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION, JICPOA AND P.O.W. SOURCES.
- TARGETS SHOWN ARE FROM 11 FEBRUARY 1945 ENEMY INSTALLATION MAP PLUS ADDITIONAL MAJOR TARGETS DISCOVERED BY JICPOA INTELLIGENCE TEAMS SUBSEQUENT TO D-1.
- IT IS BELIEVED THAT MORE DESTRUCTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED THAN THAT SHOWN BUT PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE WAS POOR DURING THE THREE DAYS OF BOMBARDMENT AND INCOMPLETE INTERPRETATION RESULTED.
- JICPOA RESULTS WERE CONSIDERED ONLY FOR THE BEACHES AND TARGETS CLOSE TO THE BEACHES WHICH WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BEFORE D-DAY.
- AN UNOFFICIAL JICPOA ESTIMATE SHOWS ON 4TH DIVISION BEACHES UP TO 400 YDS. INLAND 70% OF THE FILLBOXES WERE DESTROYED. FROM 400 YDS. INLAND TO EDGE OF NO. 1 AIRFIELD 30% OF FILLBOXES WERE DESTROYED.
- MAJORITY OF SECONDARY BATTERY NEUTRALIZATION FIRES DURING U.D.T. OPERATIONS ARE NOT SHOWN.
- ALL RANGES ARE SHOWN IN THOUSANDS OF YARDS TO THE CLOSEST HUNDRED YARDS.
- DATA ON NEW YORK TAKEN PRINCIPALLY FROM MESSAGES RECEIVED AT THE TARGET. SHIPS ACTION REPORT INDEFINITE AS TO NUMBER OF ROUNDS, FUZE AND TYPE AMMUNITION FIRED AT INDIVIDUAL TARGETS.
- WHEN S.H.F. APPEARS IN TYPE AMMO COLUMN IT REFERS TO H.C. FUZED WITH STEEL NOSE PLUGS. ALL OTHER H.C. UNLESS NOTED WAS FUZED WITH P.D.
- MAIN BATTERY AMMUNITION FIRED BY TUSCALOOSA WAS FUZED 50% P.D. 50% S.H.F.


	DESTROYED		D-3		DAMAGED	
	NO	AV	TOTAL	AV	TOTAL	AV
NEVADA	1	1	1	1		
TENNESSEE	1	1	2			
IDAHO	2		2			
NEW YORK				4	4	
TEXAS*						
ARKANSAS						
CHESTER*						
PENSACOLA*	2	2	6	6		
SALT LAKE CITY*						
TUSCALOOSA*						
VICKSBURG*						
TOTAL	3	1	2	7	10	10

* Destruction or Damage determined from photo interpretation only.

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SHIP	NO RDS	CAL	AV RN	DESTRUCTION			DAMAGE			SHIPS REMARKS	TYPE
				SHIP	API	JIC	SHIP	API	JIC		
TUSCALOOSA	22	5	10							TARGET NEUTRALIZED 2 HITS NO RESULTS	AAC
TUSCALOOSA	13	5	8							4 HITS - NEUTRALIZED NO ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE MADE NEUTRALIZED	AAC
TUSCALOOSA	44	8	12							12 HITS AARTY NEUTRALIZED	AAC
SALT LAKE CITY	124	6	11							AREA COVERAGE 1 COVERED ARTY HIT	HC
NEVADA	47	5	11							NO ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE	HC
SALT LAKE CITY	64	8	12							NO DAMAGE	AAC
TEXAS	12	14	106							AREA COVERAGE	HC
SALT LAKE CITY	20	8	9.7							AREA COVERAGE	HC
NEVADA	32	5	11							AREA COVERAGE NO HITS OBSERVED POSSIBLY HIT ONE GUN AREA COVERAGE	HC
TEXAS	22	14	9							15 HITS IN CAVES	HC
TEXAS	8	14	9.8							DAMAGE UNKNOWN	AAC
TEXAS	44	14	12							SEVERAL NEAR MISSES AREA COVERED	HC
TEXAS	32	14	107							HAZY HARD TO OBSERVE. THIS AMPL EXPENDED THROUGHOUT DAY IN THESE AREAS 2 DIRECT HITS 4 NEAR MISSES	HC
TEXAS	10	14	8.9							NO HITS	HC
ARKANSAS	21	5	6							RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	HC
NEVADA	116	5	8							2 NEAR MISSES	HC
ARKANSAS	31	12	7								HC
ARKANSAS	97	12	13								HC
ARKANSAS	14	12	8								HC
TENNESSEE	14	14	10								HC
TENNESSEE	9	14	11.5								HC



SHIP	NO RDS	CAL	AV RN	DESTRUCTION			DAMAGE			SHIPS REMARKS	TYPE
				SHIP	API	JIC	SHIP	API	JIC		
VICKSBURG	47	6	15.6							PRESUMED DESTROYED NO OBSERVATION	HC
VICKSBURG	7	6	18.2							OBSCURED TARGET	HC
VICKSBURG	18	6	17.4							POOR VISIBILITY	HC
VICKSBURG	18	6	18.6							JAP JAMMING	HC
VICKSBURG	17	6	17							POOR VISIBILITY	HC
VICKSBURG	16	6	17.4							APPEARED TO BE ON TARGET	HC
VICKSBURG	26	6	18.4							DIRECT HITS	AAC
VICKSBURG	79	5	18.5								HC
PENSACOLA	33	8	12							2 OR MORE GUNS DESTROYED	HC
VICKSBURG	11	6	16							NO SPOTS AA FIRING CEASED	HC
VICKSBURG	38	6	19								HC
PENSACOLA	35	8	8.6							GUNS PROBABLY DAMAGED	HC
PENSACOLA	10	8	12							ESTIMATED 1/3 DESTROYED	HC
PENSACOLA	24	8	12							25% DESTROYED VOF REPORTED ON TARGET	HC
VICKSBURG	10	6	22.4							SPOTTED ON AIR BURSTS	HC
VICKSBURG	7	6	22.2								HC
VICKSBURG	14	6	22							AREA WELL COVERED AIR BURSTS	HC
VICKSBURG	32	6	24								HC
VICKSBURG	2	6	21.5								HC
PENSACOLA	15	8	9							BATTERY SILENCED	HC
NEW YORK	7	14	?								HC
NEW YORK	21	14	?								HC
NEW YORK	11	14	?							NEUTRALIZED	HC
NEVADA	40	5	9								AAC
NEVADA	72	5	10								AAC
NEW YORK	10	14	?								HC
PENSACOLA	37	8	10							SEVERAL HITS OR NEAR MISSES	HC
PENSACOLA	39	8	10.7							AA FIRE SUPPRESSED STRIPPING STRIPPING 5 NEAR HITS	HC
CHESTER	2	8	8.1								HC
CHESTER	6	8	8.5								HC
CHESTER	18	5	8.1								AAC
CHESTER	2	8	8								HC
CHESTER	2	8	8.2							STRIPPING STRIPPING STRIPPING 1 NEAR HIT	HC
CHESTER	1	8	8								HC
CHESTER	11	8	18								HC
CHESTER	9	8	9.5								AAC
CHESTER	82	5	10.8							22 NEAR HITS	AAC
CHESTER	240	8	10.9								HC
NEW YORK	14	5	?								HC
CHESTER	2	8	8.3							STRIPPING NEUTRALIZATION	AAC
NEVADA	44	5	8							NO HITS OBSERVED	AAC
NEVADA	61	5	8								HC
NEVADA	6	14	8								AAC

SHIP	NO RDS	CAL	AV RN	DESTRUCTION			DAMAGE			SHIPS REMARKS	TYPE
				SHIP	API	JIC	SHIP	API	JIC		
TENNESSEE	17	14	8.5							SILENCED BATTERY	HC
TENNESSEE	80	5	8.5							COUNTER BATTERY	AAC
TENNESSEE	18	14	9								HC
IDAHO	15	5	10.5							TEN HITS IN AREA RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	AAC
TENNESSEE	46	5	11							HITS NOT OBSERVED	HC
IDAHO	9	14	11								HC
IDAHO	11	14	11							HITS NOT OBSERVED	HC
IDAHO	14	14	9							HITS NOT OBSERVED	HC
IDAHO	1	14	9.5							HITS NOT OBSERVED	HC
TENNESSEE	8	5	12							RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	AAC
NEVADA	39	14	9							4 DIRECT HITS SEVERAL NEAR MISSES	HC
NEVADA	3	14	9.2							4 NEAR MISSES	HC
NEVADA	17	14	9.5							NO HITS	HC
NEVADA	12	14	12.5							NO HITS	HC
NEVADA	15	14	12							NO HITS	HC
NEVADA	28	14	11.5							2 HITS 2 NEAR MISSES RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	HC
TENNESSEE	8	14	9.5								HC
NEVADA	16	5	10.5							AIR BURSTS	AAC
TENNESSEE	19	14	11.5							RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	HC
IDAHO	28	14	14							HITS NOT OBSERVED - LARGE AMMO EXPLOSION	HC
TENNESSEE	9	14	9.5							RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	HC
TENNESSEE	33	14	11							RESULTS NOT OBSERVED	HC

- DEFENSE SYMBOL KEY
- ⊕ BLOCKHOUSE
 - ⊙ COAST DEFENSE GUN
 - ⊙ COVERED ARTY. EMPLACEMENT
 - ⊙ DUAL PURPOSE GUN
 - ⊙ MEDIUM A.A. GUN
 - ⊙ ANTI TANK EMPLACEMENT
 - ⊙ OPEN ARTY. EMPLACEMENT
 - ⊙ FILLBOX
 - ⊙ EARTH COVERED STRUCTURE
 - ⊙ RADAR
 - ⊙ RANGEFINDER
 - ⊙ SEARCHLIGHT
 - ⊙ COMMAND POST
 - ⊙ AMMUNITION DUMP

ENCLOSURE (D) TO APPENDIX III



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[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

Iwo Jima

PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

Photographic Study

UNCLASSIFIED



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

DEMO
dimensi@e ridotta

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



SURIBACHI AREA SHOWING SLIDES CAUSED BY NAVAL GUNFIRE.



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ridotta

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
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RUINS OF 4 - 120 MM COAST DEFENSE GUNS IN 132 K,L, DESTROYED BY TENNESSEE.



CLOSE UP OF THE BREACH OF C.D. GUN.



VIEWS OF DAMAGED EMPLACEMENTS

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APPENDIX IV

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

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I. GENERAL COMMENT

A. There follows a compilation of ammunition expended by fire support ships at IWO Jima. In many cases the figures do not correspond with those given in Paragraph IV of ships' action reports because where possible, figures were taken from the statistical record of fires, which is believed to be more accurate. Some figures are estimates where action reports have not been received by this headquarters. Figures are compiled to show the types of ammunition, the number of rounds, and the total weight.

B. The following symbols are used:

AF: Armor Piercing Ammunition
 HC: High Capacity Ammunition

C. 55.2 pounds is the weight figure used for all 5"/38 projectiles.

II. EXPENDITURES

A. SHELLS

	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ROUNDS</u>	<u>WEIGHT (lbs)</u>
BB 33	ARKANSAS	12" HC	1,262	933,850
		5"/51	1,808	90,400
		3"/50	435	5,655
BB 34	NEW YORK	14" HC	1,018	1,297,950
		14" AF	19	28,500
		5"/51	712	35,600
		3"/50	428	5,564
BB 35	TEXAS	14" HC	923	1,176,825
		5"/51	879	43,950
BB 36	NEVADA	14" HC	950	1,211,250
		14" AF	20	30,000
		5"/38	7,409	408,977
BB 42	IDAHO	14" HC	1,285	1,638,375
		5"/38	3,638	200,818
BB 43	TENNESSEE	14" HC	1,358	1,731,450
		5"/38	6,730	371,496
BB 48	WEST VIRGINIA	16" HC	463	879,700
		16" AF	46	103,040
		5"/38	5,376	296,755
BB 55	NORTH CAROLINA	16" HC	955	1,514,500
		5"/38	2,753	151,966
56	WASHINGTON	16" HC	790	1,501,000
		5"/38	2,440	134,688
CA 24	PENSACOLA	8" HC	2,658	691,080
		5"/25	1,368	73,872

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